General William "Bill " Lee , was the first General commander of the Screaming Eagles or 101 st Airborne Division.General William C. Lee, a native of Dunn, N.C., was one of the pioneer officers in the U.S. Airborne and was instrumental in "writing the book"on early practices and procedures. As such, he became known to many as "The Father of the U.S. Airborne." Born in 1895, General Lee commanded the Provisional Parachute Group at Ft. Benning, starting in March of 1941. When the 101st Airborne Division was activated in 1942, General Lee became the original Division commander. Bill Lee led the Screaming Eagles through training and took the division to England in mid 1943. A few months before D-day, General Lee suffered a heart attack and had to relinquish his command to Maxwell Taylor. General Lee returned to the Zone of Interior, where he avidly followed the exploits of his beloved division as they fought through Normandy, Holland and the historic defense of Bastogne. In tribute to General Lee's legacy to the division, all 101st paratroopers were instructed to shout "Bill Lee" when jumping into Normandy. General Lee sadly died a few short years after WW2 ended, but his former residence in Dunn, N.C. is now a museum, which preserves the history of his life and Army career.
Rendez-Vous with Destiny
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The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) has demonstrated the characteristics of military professionalism since the unit's activation Aug. 15, 1942. On August 19, 1942, the first commander, Maj. Gen. William C. Lee, promised his new recruits that the 101st has no history, but it has a "Rendezvous with destiny."
As a division, the 101st has never failed that prophecy. During World War II, the 101st Airborne Division led the way on D-Day in the night drop prior to the invasion. When surrounded at Bastogne, Brig. Gen. Anthony McAuliffe answered "NUTS!" and the Screaming Eagles fought on until the siege was lifted. For their valiant efforts and heroic deeds during World War II, the 101st Airborne Division was awarded four campaign streamers and two Presidential Unit Citations.
General Order Number Five, which gave birth to the division, reads, "The 101st Airborne Division, activated at Camp Claiborne, Louisiana, has no history, but it has a rendezvous with destiny. Like the early American pioneers whose invincible courage was the foundation stone of this nation, we have broken with the past and its traditions in order to establish our claim to the future.
"Due to the nature of our armament, and the tactics in which we shall perfect ourselves, we shall be called upon to carry out operations of far-reaching military importance and we shall habitually go into action when the need is immediate and extreme.
"Let me call your attention to the fact that our badge is the great American eagle. This is a fitting emblem for a division that will crush its enemies by falling upon them like a thunderbolt from the skies.
"The history we shall make, the record of high achievement we hope to write in the annals of the American Army and the American people, depends wholly and completely on the men of this division. Each individual, each officer and each enlisted man, must therefore regard himself as a necessary part of a complex and powerful instrument for the overcoming of the enemies of the nation. Each, in his own job, must realize that he is not only a means, but an indispensable means for obtaining the goal of victory. it is, therefore, not too much to say that the future itself, in whose molding we expect to have our share, is in the hands of the soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division."
Going To War in Europe :
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After the 101st was formed, only the toughest men were allowed to serve. The division needed men that could survive being dropped from an airplane behind enemy lines and still fight and win. Only 1 in 3 men passed the selection criteria to serve in the 101st which included a 140 mile foot march in 3 days and rigorous airborne training. In September of 1943 after the Division had completed it's Airborne training, it moved to England to prepare for war. On June 5th, 1944 the Division prepared for its first combat operation, the airborne invasion of Normandy. The 101st would drop 6,700 soldiers behind enemy lines to disrupt the Germans before the massive allied beach assault on the coast of Normandy. As soon as the planes caring the soldiers of the 101st flew into France, they began receiving heavy antiaircraft fire from the Germans. The pilots took evasive action and broke formation to avoid being hit. As a result, soldiers jumped at an altitude of 300 feet at a speed of 200 mph instead of the planned 700 feet at 100 mph. This caused the division to be scattered all over Normandy. Soldiers landed far from their units, behind enemy lines, and alone. Many were killed before they hit the ground by Germans firing into the sky. By the end of the 1st day of the Normandy invasion, only 1 in 3 soldiers had found their unit. The scattered jump into Normandy confused the Germans just as much as it confused the Americans. The Germans did not know where to fight the Americans or these were no real front lines. Fighting consisted of small unit actions. During the 2nd day of the invasion the 101st began to regroup and receive resupplies by gliders, many of which crashed on landing. During the next 2 days of fighting the 101st took objectives behind Utah beach and turned south towards Carentan, which was key to controlling the peninsula. The Germans had been ordered to fight to the last man. After days of heavy fighting, the 101st took Carentan. The division held the town for 2 more days under a heavy German counter attack until reinforcements arrived. One month after jumping into Europe, the 101st mission in Normandy was complete, 1 in 4 men had been killed or wounded. In September, 1944 the 101st jumped into Holland to conduct Operation Market Garden. The mission was to jump behind enemy lines to seize the highway running north to the Rhine river so allied tanks could advance into Germany. This highway was known as "hell's highway," and paved the way for the allied advance. 600 gliders landed in Holland, bringing in half the division. This jump was much more organized than the previous jump into Normandy. The 101st mission was to secure the southern end of the highway. It completed this mission in 2 days. The division was responsible for 60 miles of road and 16 miles of highway. 101st was next sent to the front lines near Arnhem. On December 17th, 1944 over 12,000 101st soldiers were sent south to fight in what would be known as the Battle of the Bulge. The 101st arrived in Bastonge just ahead of the Germans and took control of the city. The Division formed a perimeter around Bastonge and held the city against fierce German fire. The Germans surrounded the town and cut off all roads. The division was cut off without supplies and was a sitting target for German artillery. Because the division had been deployed to Bastonge so quickly many soldiers had to endure the harsh winter without winter clothes. After 5 days of withstanding attacks by the Germans without reinforcements or supplies, two German Officers were sent to the American Headquarters with a letter from the German Commander demanding that the 101st surrender. After hearing that the Germans wanted the 101st to surrender, the Acting Commander - BG General McAuliffe said "Nuts". Surrendering was not an option for the 101st so "Nuts" was chosen as the official response to the Germans demand for surrender. The Germans continued their attack of the American perimeter without success, and the 101st continued to hold the city. On December 26, 1944 the 101st was relieved by General Patton's Third Army and the siege of Bastonge ended. The 101st continued to fight, pushing the Germans back towards their own border and eventually into Germany itself. The Division entered the town of Burtchesgartens were Hitler's fortified residence "The Eagles Nest" was located. The soldiers walked through Hitler's personal residence and enjoyed the comforts of his personal retreat.
The day of days : 06.06.1944
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THE 101 st AIRBORNE ASSAULT on Normandy
While Task Force U was still approaching the Transport Area, the first blows had already struck the enemy from the air. The intensive air bombardment of the invasion area had started about midnight, 5 June. At that time RAF bombers made intensive attacks on the known enemy batteries along the entire invasion coast. Shortly before H Hour medium bombers of the Ninth Air Force dropped several hundred tons of bombs on enemy defenses at Utah Beach in support of the seaborne assault. Between these bombings, however, came the still more telling attacks by airborne infantry.It was the largest use of airborne troops up to that time. Paratroop elements of the 82d and 101st Divisions, comprising 6 regiments, with the normal complement of parachute field artillery and engineers, numbering more than 13,000 men, were flown from bases in southern England to the Cotentin Peninsula in approximately 925 C-47's. An additional 4,000 men, consisting of glider infantry with supporting weapons and medical and signal units, were to arrive in 500 gliders later on D Day and on D plus 1 to reinforce the paratroops. Seaborne echelons were to join the divisions on D plus 1. To the parachute troops was assigned what was probably the most difficult task of the initial operation—a night jump behind enemy lines five hours before the coastal landings.
At 22:15 on D minus 1, 432 C-47's began taking off from 7 departure airdromes in England, with 6,600 paratroops of the 101st Airborne Division. They were scheduled to begin dropping at H minus s hours. At dawn (H minus 2 hours) they were to be reinforced by approximately 150 glider troops from 51 gliders, and at dusk (H plus 15 hours) by an additional 165 in 32 gliders. Preceding the main echelons of paratroops by half an hour were 20 pathfinder aircraft which had the mission of marking six drop zones (for both divisions) and one landing zone. Marking of the zones was not entirely successful, but all of the pathfinder teams carried out at least part of their missions.Paratroop echelons approached the Cotentin from the west and made their landfall in the vicinity of les Pieux .Formations were tight until reaching the coast, but from the coast to the Merderet cloud banks loosened the formations, and east of the Merderet flak scattered them further. In general the division did not have a good drop, although better than that of the 82d Airborne Division.About 1,500 troops were either killed or captured and approximately 60 percent of the equipment dropped was lost when the bundles fell into swamps or into fields covered by enemy fire. Only a fraction of the division's organized strength could initially be employed on the planned missions, and many of the missions carried out were undertaken by mixed groups which did not correspond with original assignments.The fifty-one Waco gliders, carrying command personnel and antitank weapons, came in early on D-Day morning. This type of landing had never been attempted before in darkness. Many gliders were wrecked as they landed in the small Normandy fields and there as damage to equipment and loss of personnel, one of the casualties being Brig. Gen. Don F. Pratt (Assistant Commander, 101st Airborne Division), who was killed in landing. In general, however, losses were not excessive and the mission was a success. Later in the day, at 2100, the serial of thirty-two Horsa gliders—carrying command, communications, and medical personnel and equipment—suffered heavier losses in personnel and gliders because of the unsuitability of the small landing fields. Equipment suffered relatively little damage. A seaborne echelon of the division, including the 3 27th Glider Infantry, joined the division on D plus 1. The initial widespread dispersion of the 101st Division was not an unmixed evil. The Germans appear to have been confused by the scattered drops. For some time they were unable to estimate the magnitude of the invasion and, in consequence, reaction was slow and uncertain. The war diary of the German Seventh Army noted at 0130, 6 June, reports of Allied paratroop landings east and northwest of Caen, at St. Maricove, at Montebourg, on both sides of the Vire River, and on the east coast of the Cotentin Peninsula. Fighting was reported at le Ham. For several hours the German command was uncertain whether the landings represented a major action. At 0400 it was estimated that the American plan seemed to be to “tie off the Cotentin Peninsula at its narrowest point.” Uncertainty at the enemy command level seemed to have been duplicated among the subordinate units. It was generally the experience of the 101st Airborne Division, at least, that although the enemy defended freely with fire he was initially reluctant to move out of his prepared defenses to attack. When attacks were launched they were seldom pushed vigorously. Thus in some measure the enemy's confusion tended to offset that of the invaders and, by dint of considerable improvisation, the 101st was able to accomplish most of its initial missions.The plan of the 101st Airborne Division called for the seizure of the four inland exits—the western ends of causeways-from the inundated area west of Utah Beach between St. Martin-de-Varreville and Pouppeville .In the southern part of the division's sector two bridges across the Douve River, on the main highway northwest of Carentan and the railroad bridge to the west, were to be destroyed. In addition, the division was to seize and hold the la Barquette lock and establish two bridgeheads over the Douve at le Port northeast of Carentan. The sum of these missions thus provided for the clearing of the enemy's secondary beach defenses and the organization of the Corps' southern flank for defense and further exploitation. After being relieved in the beachhead area by the 4th Division, the 101st was to seize Carentan and establish contact with V Corps, fusing the Utah and Omaha beachheads. Thereafter the 101st Airborne Division was ordered to protect the southern flank of VII Corps east of the Merderet River. The division would be reinforced by the attachment of a company of tanks of the 70th Tank Battalion, the 65th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, and a troop of the 4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron when these were landed by sea.
The task of securing the two northern beach exits was assigned to the 502d Parachute Infantry, with the 377th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion. The 502d was to drop immediately to the west of Exits 3 and 4 in Drop Zone A. The 2d Battalion was to capture and destroy the coastal battery at St. Martin-de-Varreville as quickly as possible. The 3d Battalion was to support this operation, if necessary, and then secure Exits 3 and 4 so that the 4th Division could come up the causeways at H Hour. The 2d Battalion was to remain on the gun position as regimental reserve and establish contact with the 506th Parachute Infantry on its right. The 1st Battalion was to clean up a group of buildings, thought to be the German artillery garrison quarters, just west of St. Martin-de-Varreville. It was also to cover the northern flank of the regiment, establish contact with the 82d Airborne Division on the left, and cover the emplacing of the 377th Glider Field Artillery Battalion guns. The four serials of the 502d Parachute Infantry came in ten minutes apart. The 2d Battalion led with regimental headquarters, followed by the 3d, the 1st, and the artillery battalion.The 2d Battalion failed to land in Drop Zone A as planned. A large percentage of the men came down on the southern edge of Drop Zone C. Assembly, without landmarks and far from the designated assembly points, consumed most of the day, and the battalion as a unit took no part in the D-Day fighting. Lt. Col. Robert G. Cole, commanding the 3d Battalion, landed several hundred yards east of Ste. Mère-Eglise .Unable to orient himself, he moved toward Ste. Mère-Eglise, collecting a miscellaneous group of about thirty men from regimental headquarters, Company G of the 506th Parachute Infantry, and a few from the 82d Airborne Division. From Ste. Mère-Eglise the men back-tracked north and then northeast, heading for the two northern exits of the beach. On the way the group snowballed to about seventy-five men and made contact with a small enemy convoy. Several of the enemy were killed and ten taken prisoner. This was the only incident of the march.On nearing St. Martin-de-Varreville, a reconnaissance party was sent to the enemy coastal battery. It found that the position had been destroyed by bombing and was deserted. No heavy guns were found, although there was ammunition in the pits and, antiaircraft guns, including some multiple 20-mm. mounts. Colonel Cole then split his force to seize Exits 3 and 4 and dispatched a small group of men to seek contact with the 506th Parachute Infantry. At 0930, two hours after the defense was established at Exit 3, in the vicinity of Audouville-la-Hubert, the enemy began retreating across the causeway from the beach. Colonel Cole's men, without loss to themselves, killed 50 to 75 of the enemy, and at 1300 established contact with the 1st Battalion of the 8th Infantry (4th Division). By the end of the day 250 men had gathered under Colonel Cole. That night his battalion was ordered to assemble the next day in the vicinity of Blosville, south of Ste. Mère-Eglise, as regimental reserve. The St. Martin-de-Varreville position had been a considerable worry to the planners. It had been bombed during the night of 28-29 May, when 356 tons of bombs were dropped by the RAF Bomber Command. Photo reconnaissance, later confirmed by captured German documents, showed heavy damage. Nevertheless, this battery was included among the RAF targets for the night attack of 5-6 June.The 1st Battalion, 502d Parachute Infantry (Lt. Col. Patrick J. Cassidy), had a much stiffer fight for its D-Day objectives. Colonel Cassidy landed near St. Germain-de-Varreville in the center of the battalion's drop one and a mile from the first objective-the artillery garrison buildings designated as "WXYZ" in the plan. He gradually collected a small force, mostly from his own battalion, and after discovery of a road sign began moving toward the objective. Objective W, the house at the crossroads west of St. Martin-de-Varreville, was unoccupied. Colonel Cassidy set up his command post in the house and then checked the enemy gun position across the road. There he found a dozen men under Lt. Col. Steve A. Chappuis (commander of the 2d Battalion); Colonel Chappuis, though injured in the jump, had been able to reach his objective. He had decided to wait at the gun position for more of his men. Colonel Cassidy proceeded with his own mission. His plan was, first, to establish defenses at the St. Martin-de-Varreville intersection to prevent the enemy from moving east into the beach area, and then to clean out the XYZ buildings and set up a defensive line to the north.A patrol sent to check Exit 4 found both it and the causeway clear. The 3d Battalion, in the meantime, reported Exit 3 covered, and Colonel Cassidy, after relaying this information to the 4th Division, turned his attention to consolidating the battalion position. Several groups from Company A assembled north of St. Martin-de-Varreville during the morning. Forty-five men were collected by Lt. W. A. Swanson and ordered to move to Foucarville to establish the right anchor of the battalion line with a series of road blocks. Lieutenant Swanson set up four blocks shortly after noon and within half an hour he trapped and largely destroyed a 4-vehicle enemy troop convoy moving east from Beuzeville-au-Plain. Despite this success, Company A's positions were not secure as they were dominated by the enemy on the hill to the northwest. The Germans, however, made no determined effort to break through, although a fire fight continued most of the day as the enemy probed at the road blocks without discovering their essential weakness.Meanwhile the fight at XYZ was carried on most of the day by a mixed group of men under Sergeant Summers, while Company C was held in reserve. It was not an easy task. Not until 1530 were the Germans driven out of the last building, after its roof was fired with bazooka rounds. More than one hundred were killed or taken prisoner as they tried to escape. Another fifty had been killed or captured earlier in the fight.The establishment of the western end of the battalion line was facilitated by the arrival in the area of Lt. Col. John H. Michaelis, regimental commander, with two hundred men. This left Colonel Cassidy free to move the 1st Battalion north and complete his D-Day mission. Company C was ordered to Beuzeville-au-Plain, while Company B reassembled in the artillery barracks area. Actually Beuzeville-au-Plain was not reached that night. Company C moved in a body north to St. Germain-de-Varreville and then west along a stream bed toward its objective. A little more than halfway the company split into three "platoons," no more than combat patrols in strength. Each of these platoons became involved separately with small enemy forces at the hamlet of Fournel, which the leading group had mistaken for Beuzeville-au-Plain. At dark the paratroopers withdrew, and a company line was established south of Fournel, facing northwest.During the night the line was subjected to continuing enemy pressure from the west. To cope with this threat, Colonel Cassidy put Company B, which had moved north after reassembling, into the line on the left flank. As there was still a dangerous gap between Company C and the battalion's right flank held by Company A, Colonel Cassidy filled it temporarily with a few spare riflemen and asked Regiment for help. Regiment, however, had already decided to pass the 2d Battalion through the 1st on the following day, and therefore ordered Colonel Cassidy to withdraw and consolidate. Shortly before midnight the principal enemy threat was unexpectedly removed when the Germans on the hill opposing Company A hoisted a white flag. Bluffed into overestimating Company A's strength, chiefly by the increasing volume of mortar and machine-gun fire laid down by Lieutenant Swanson's men, eighty-seven Germans marched into the American lines. Another fifty, attempting to escape north, were shot down by American prisoners who had been freed by the surrender.
Regimental headquarters and the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 506th Parachute Infantry (Col. Robert L. Sink) were to land in Drop Zone C, between Hiesville and Ste. Marie-du-Mont; the 3d Battalion, together with a platoon of the 326th Engineer Battalion and two demolitions sections, was to land in Drop Zone D, between Vierville and Bse. Addeville (Map No. 4). The 506th Infantry had a dual mission-to seize the western edge of the inundated area back of Utah Beach between Audouville-la-Hubert and Pouppeville (including Exits 1 and 2), and to defend the line of the Douve within its sector, capturing the two bridges near the mouth of the Douve at le Port and establishing a bridgehead over the Douve at this point for subsequent use by the division. The bridges were to be prepared for demolition. These missions were broken down as follows. The 2d Battalion, with one demolitions section, was to seize the two southern exits to the causeways. The battalion was to assemble at Hébert; Company F was to go to Pouppeville and secure Exit 1; Company E, to Houdienville and secure Exit 2; and Company D was to remain at Hébert with battalion headquarters as reserve. The 1st Battalion was to assemble at Hiesville and together with Regimental Headquarters Company constitute the regimental reserve. A reinforced platoon from Company B was to be sent to the south of Ste. Marie-du-Mont to create a diversion and draw the attention of enemy forces there. The 3d Battalion was to seize the two eastern bridges and cross the river to secure a bridgehead at le Port. In the flight from England and the landings in the respective drop zones on the peninsula, the 506th Parachute Infantry's experience was similar to that of the 502d. The 126 planes cleared the English coast in good weather shortly after midnight, but when they approached the French coast, fog, and later flak, forced the dispersal of the formation, which resulted in a widely scattered drop . The 3d Battalion had a good pattern in Drop Zone D, but the 2d Battalion was completely out of its zone. Of eighty-one planes scheduled to drop troops in Drop Zone C, only ten found their mark. Yet the resulting difficulties in assembling did not prove serious. Within two hours of landing Colonel Sink had collected forty men of his headquarters near the rendezvous point.
Colonel Robert "Bob"Sink
Near by, the 1st Battalion (Lt. Col. William L. Turner) was assembling slowly, and the whole group soon moved to Culoville, where the regiment established its command post. No word had been received of the 3d Battalion to the south, or the 2d Battalion, which should have landed in Drop Zone C to accomplish one of the regiment's most critical missions-the seizure of the two southern exits. Colonel Sink wished the 1st Battalion to take over that mission, but, as Colonel Turner had only about fifty men, it seemed foolhardy to split the force and attempt to occupy both exits. Colonel Turner was therefore ordered to proceed only to Pouppeville and seize Exit 1.About the same time, similar orders were given to the 3d Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry (Lt. Col. Julian Ewell), by the division commander, General Taylor, who had little knowledge of the whereabouts of his units and was particularly worried about the southern exits. The 3d Battalion had been designated originally as division reserve to land in Drop Zone C and protect the glider landing zone northwest of Hiesville. Although the battalion serial had been scattered, like the others, because of fog and flak, and had lost three planes with three-fourths of their personnel to enemy antiaircraft fire, a substantial number of the men came down within the prescribed area and assembled without undue delay. Just south of Ste. Marie-du-Mont, Colonel Ewell dropped with ninety of his own men and sixty from division headquarters. Another 150 men of his battalion assembled near Hiesville and set up the division command post there as planned. Colonel Ewell, with elements of his battalion (forty men from line companies and some headquarters personnel), set out at 0600 for Pouppeville. General Taylor, Brig. Gen. Anthony J. McAuliffe (101st Airborne Division Artillery Commander), and eighteen other officers accompanied the column. The only enemy troops contacted on the march were six Germans at an outpost west of Ste. Marie-du-Mont. Pouppeville was held by sixty to seventy men of the 1058th Regiment (91st Division). Colonel Ewell's men attacked the town. Enemy resistance was not determined, but Colonel Ewell was handicapped by the smallness of his force, which prevented him from maneuvering to envelop the enemy. Three hours were thus consumed in slow house-to-house fighting. At noon the German commander surrendered. Colonel Ewell's battalion had suffered eighteen casualties and inflicted twenty-five on the enemy. An additional thirty-eight Germans were taken prisoner. Some of the enemy forces had withdrawn to the beach, but the approach of 8th Infantry, 4th Division, from that side made their position hopeless. Colonel Ewell heard the 4th Division coming, set up his machine guns, and waited for the nutcracker to close. The Germans surrendered to the 8th Infantry, and it was here, at Pouppeville, that Lt. Col. Carlton O. MacNeely (2d Battalion, 8th Infantry) and Colonel Ewell established the first contact between seaborne and airborne forces. In talking to 4th Division men at Pouppeville General Taylor learned for the first time that the 4th's progress was rapid and that the Utah exits were secure. He thereupon decided to direct the 101st's efforts to the second part of its mission-securing the Corps' southern flank.Meanwhile elements of the 1st Battalion, 506th Parachute Infantry, under Colonel Turner, became engaged in a series of small fights and were thus delayed in their advance on Pouppeville. When they arrived, Colonel Ewell's men had already occupied the town and the 4th Division was coming in across the causeway. Colonel Turner's force therefore returned to the command post at Culoville. While Exit 1 was being secured, the 2d Battalion, 506th Parachute Infantry (Lt. Col. Robert L. Strayer), was advancing on Exit 2, although this was not known at regimental headquarters. The battalion had achieved a rapid assembly of about two hundred of its men, despite the handicap of a drop entirely out of its designated one. Some eighty men of battalion headquarters (including communications personnel and a machine gun platoon) and about one hundred men from the line companies, principally Company D, had gathered under the battalion S-2 and S-3 near Foucarville. They were joined by twenty men of the 508th Parachute Infantry (82d Airborne Division) and, at 0330, by Colonel Strayer with a group of fifteen men who had initially tied up with the 1st Battalion, 502d Parachute Infantry. The consolidated force moved out about 0430, heading south. But it immediately met opposition from enemy troops which had moved between Foucarville and St. Germain-de-Varreville after the 1st Battalion, 502d Parachute Infantry, had passed to attack the XYZ buildings. Here Colonel Strayer's men were held up most of the morning by machine-gun positions and interdictory artillery fire across the road. Part of Company D finally was able to bypass the resistance points and, hurrying south, reached Exit 2 at 1330. Colonel Strayer, with the remainder of the battalion, joined these men about an hour later, and by 1800 the battalion had organized the position at Houdienville. By that time, however, elements of the 4th Division and tanks of the 70th Tank Battalion had already crossed the causeway and were proceeding inland. Throughout most of the day, regimental headquarters, 506th Parachute Infantry, at Culoville felt virtually alone on the peninsula. It had no contact with the 2d and 3d Battalions, little knowledge of other units of the division, and only sketchy information about the location and strength of the enemy. Its isolation was due in part to the scarcity of radio communication; a more important factor, however, was the small number of men which Colonel Sink had at his disposal and which he decided to keep together in order to protect the rear of the causeway forces and to provide a nucleus for further concentration of the regiment. During the morning he sent out a number of combat patrols to probe enemy dispositions and try to make contact with the 3d Battalion. The missions were not successful. Contact was made only with isolated enemy groups and did nothing to clear up the basic confusion. At the same time that patrols were seeking out the enemy, actions were developing in the immediate vicinity of the command post. At Holdy, 1,000 yards northeast of Culoville, about seventy men of the 506th Parachute Infantry and the 82d Airborne Division had run into a previously unlocated enemy 105-mm. battery. They could make no headway against enemy defenses of the position, however, and asked for reinforcements. Colonel Sink gradually assembled an additional seventy or eighty men from the 1st Battalion at the command post and sent them up under Capt. Lloyd E. Patch of the 1st Battalion Headquarters Company and Capt. Knut H. Raudstein of Company C. When the reinforcements approached, the Germans withdrew to the earth revetments of the gun emplacements. Rockets were fired into the position, and after they had taken their toll Captains Patch and Raudstein moved the infantry in from two sides. The battery had thus been overrun when a lieutenant of the 502d Parachute Infantry brought up from forty to fifty more reinforcements. Captain Patch turned over to them responsibility for outposting the guns and reassembled his own force to attack Ste. Marie-du-Mont from the west. The town was taken when elements of the 4th Division, which had crossed the causeway, entered from the east and squeezed out the enemy. While Captain Patch's men were thus engaged, the lieutenant, doubtful of his ability to hold the gun position with so few men, began destruction of the battery. Meanwhile, Colonel Sink had sent word to save the guns, as he had little other artillery available. The order came in time to rescue only one of the four guns. Before the patrols and various forces which Colonel Sink had sent out returned that evening, the colonel's attention was drawn to the vulnerability of the command post itself. In mid-afternoon the sound of small arms came closer and closer. Twice he scraped together all the officers and men in the command post to hold back the Germans who pressed in from the surrounding hedgerows. When the forces of Colonel Strayer (2d Battalion) and Colonel Turner (1st Battalion) came in that evening, after being relieved by the 4th Division, Colonel Sink had a total of about 650 men, most of them from the 1st and 2d Battalions, but including also antitank personnel, men from the 82d Airborne Division, and scattered units of the 101st Airborne Division. There was still no contact with the 3d Battalion, and the whole situation to the south was vague and uncertain. Both General Taylor and General McAuliffe had visited the command post late in the afternoon en route from Pouppeville, and plans had been made to move south in the morning.
Unknown to Colonel Sink, a small force from his 3d Battalion, of slightly more than platoon strength, had collected itself and proceeded to its objective. The 3d Battalion, 506th Parachute Infantry, was to have landed in Drop one D, in the vicinity of Angoville-au-Plain, and to have seized the le Port bridges. The enemy evidently anticipated a drop in the area. Shortly before the drop, heavy antiaircraft fire was encountered. An oil-soaked building near the drop field was set on fire and the paratroops were immediately hit by machine-gun and mortar fire. Some of the men landed in or at the edge of the swampy plain east of Angoville-au-Plain. The battalion S-3, Capt. Charles G. Shettle, came down near Angoville-au-Plain and walked toward the town, looking for some of his men. He found only two other officers and twelve enlisted men. But his thoughts were centered on the bridges, and, without further attempting to build up his force, he set out for the objective. There were thirty-three in the group when the northern bridge at le Port was reached at 0430. Despite some fire from the opposite shore, a crossing was made and the east bank occupied. When an additional five officers and fifteen men joined the “battalion,” Captain Shettle decided to cross the other bridge as well. Officers of Company H led patrols to the far bank, crossing under the bridge, and the command group followed. Although the bridgehead force killed some Germans and knocked out a few machine guns, after two hours the fight became unequal. The Americans ran low on ammunition and, having no contact with friendly forces, had no hope of reinforcing their position. They withdrew to the west bank to hold there for the remainder of the day. Contact was made later with the group under Col. Howard R. Johnson (commanding the 501st Parachute Infantry) at the la Barquette dam, and Captain Shettle asked for reinforcements. But Colonel Johnson, who was in an equally precarious situation, could spare none. The best he could do was to promise help in case of emergency. The help that finally came, however, was fortuitous; that night forty men who had dropped farther south, in the Carentan area, walked in and joined the group. Actually the Germans made almost no effort to take advantage of Shettle's weakness. In the middle of the night they tried a tentative push toward the bridge, which Shettle's engineers had already prepared for demolition, but gave up in the face of American small-arms fire. Captain Shettle had thus set up the left anchor of a defensive line along the division's south flank. The completion of the division's defensive line in the south was the mission of the 1st and 2d Battalions, 501st Parachute Infantry (Colonel Johnson). To carry it out the 1st Battalion was ordered to seize the lock on the Douve River at la Barquette, and the 2d Battalion (Lt. Col. Robert A. Ballard) to blow the Douve River bridges on the main road from St. Come-du-Mont to Carentan . The regiment was also ordered to take St. Come-du-Mont, if possible, and to destroy the railroad bridge to the west. Of these objectives, the la Barquette lock had assumed a special importance in the eyes of the planners. The lock, located due north of Carentan, controls the water level of the Douve River to the west as far as the confluence of the Merderet. When the lock is opened the high tide floods the river channel and spreads gradually over the whole low marshy area between St. Côme-du-Mont and Carentan. Ultimately, through opening and closing the lock according to the tide level, the valleys of the Douve and Merderet can be turned into a shallow lake as far north as le Ham and as far west as St. Sauveur-le Vicomte. East of the lock the tide flow is kept in the river channel by flood banks from six to eight feet high. During the years when the RAF had this area under observation, inundations were observed periodically, extending in a large westward area between the ridges of high ground around St. Côme-du-Mont and the solid lower ground south and west of Carentan. Possession of the lock therefore meant control of a potentially valuable natural barrier to possible German counterattack against the south flank of the beachhead. Furthermore, if seizure of the lock were coupled with destruction of the bridges north of Carentan on the only good route across the swamps, the task of safeguarding the left flank of VII Corps would be greatly facilitated. Actually the tactical value of the lock was exaggerated. The flooding was unusually slight and erratic. The area behind the lock was flooded and drained so slowly that the inundation could not be used as a flexible defense measure.Securing of this objective came close to failure at the outset, primarily because of a bad drop. The 501st Parachute Infantry, according to the original plan, was to drop between Vierville and Houesville, astride the two highways north of Carentan. A few days before D Day Drop Zone D was shifted southeastward to the area Anoville-au-Plain-Bse. Addeville at the request of Colonel Johnson, who wished to land closer to his objectives, the la Barquette lock and bridges north of Carentan. A secondary consideration which also favored this change was the fact that anti-airborne landing obstacles were appearing in the fields of the original drop zone. This brought the drop zone considerably nearer the lower Douve, and when the regiment actually made the drop, the first plane serial, carrying the 1st Battalion and regimental headquarters, was badly scattered, some of its sticks landing deep in enemy territory south of Carentan. Many others landed in the swampy bottom lands to the west. The 1st Battalion's command personnel was particularly hard hit. The commanding officer was killed, his executive officer was apparently captured, and all other company commanders and staff were also missing initially. In part, at least, the day was saved by an accident. A large percentage of planes of the 1st and 2d Battalions' serials had unloaded too soon. As the jump signal flashed in Colonel Johnson's plane, a bundle became wedged in the door. The delay caused by this prevented a premature unloading and brought Colonel Johnson and his men squarely down on Drop Zone D. Moving south, Colonel Johnson collected some 150 men of miscellaneous units. At the trail junction just north of the lock, he verified his position and sent fifty men to take the objective, while the remainder of the force deployed defensively in place. The assault reached the lock in one dash, crossed it, and dug in on the soft ground of the far bank before the enemy could bring the area under shell fire. Even then the Germans made no attempt to press in on the bridgehead. Colonel Johnson thought that with a little additional strength he could proceed with the mission of blowing the bridges, which were only 2,000 yard up the river. But the patrols sent out in that direction drew fire with every movement. Satisfied that the lock situation was in hand, that his own position on this low-lying hollow was not favorable, and that he would need a stronger force for the task of destroying the Douve bridges, Colonel Johnson decided to move north and make contact with elements of the regiment at Bse. Addeville, 1,000 yards to the northwest. Patrols had reported that Maj. R. J. Allen, regimental S-3, had a sizeable force there.Leaving the defense at the lock, Colonel Johnson took about fifty men to Bse. Addeville, hoping to gather sufficient strength to proceed against St. Come-du-Mont. At 0900, the force arrived at Bse. Addeville. Near this town Major Allen had gathered a hundred men from several units, but these were already engaged with the enemy to the north and west. Without knowledge of other units in the division, Colonel Johnson was uncertain as to how best to employ his small forces. His decision was finally crystallized by a radio broadcast of the BBC from London. It was the noon news bulletin and brought word that the invasion “is going according to plan and the operations of the American airborne divisions are meeting with success.” This news that the battle was going well elsewhere encouraged Colonel Johnson to proceed with the regimental mission. A small force was to be left at Bse. Addeville, with the bulk of his troops returning to la Barquette to move on the bridges. At this point Colonel Johnson learned that 250 men of the 2d Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry (Colonel Ballard), who had not been heard from previously, were heavily engaged at les Droueries, 1,000 yards to the northwest. Colonel Johnson was intent on the mission to the south and wanted Colonel Ballard's force to join him. But the enemy was between Colonel Ballard's force and that of Colonel Johnson's, and neither Major Allen's nor Colonel Ballard's units could move to join forces. Leaving fifty men at Bse. Addeville under Major Allen, Colonel Johnson took command of the remainder of the force and moved out at about 1330. At the la Barquette position the force was met by intense enemy artillery, mortar, and small-arms fire, coming partly from east of Carentan and partly from the direction of St. Come-du-Mont. Among the men Major Allen had collected was Lieutenant Farrell, the naval shore fire control officer. He was in radio contact with the fleet and called the Quincy. Within a few minutes the first 8-inch salvo was delivered. Despite the difficulties, Lieutenant Farrell's adjustments brought a remarkably accurate concentration on enemy positions around St. Côme-du- Mont, and their mortar fire slackened immediately. Following this the naval fire was shifted to support the 2d Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry, at les Droueries. With enemy fire partially neutralized in the vicinity of la Barquette, Colonel Johnson resumed his efforts to take the Douve bridges. A new patrol, however, again reported progress to the west impossible because of heavy enemy fire. Colonel Johnson therefore ordered the extension of the defense at the lock east and west, pushing as close to the highway as possible. The bridgehead was built up to 100 yards in depth south of the lock. As protection against attack from the north, the position was expanded about 200 yards east and west and reinforced with automatic weapons. The 250 men with Colonel Johnson were augmented at 2000 by 30 brought down by Major Allen from Bse. Addeville. About 20 of the defenders were sent out during the night on patrols in an unavailing effort to find the headquarters of the division and of the 506th Parachute Infantry. Contact with Captain Shettle's men of the 506th at le Port was maintained. The other patrols were lost. By the end of D Day Colonel Johnson's miscellaneous force had accomplished only a part of the regimental mission—the part originally assigned to the 1st Battalion. The 2d Battalion, becoming involved with the enemy in the vicinity of St. Côme-du-Mont shortly after the drop, was never able to move south to deal with the Carentan bridges on Colonel Johnson's right flank. Colonel Ballard (2d Battalion) had assembled, between Angoville-au-Plain and les Droueries, small groups from each of his three rifle companies and his battalion staff. He planned to move at once on St. Côme-du-Mont, which lay astride his main route to the Douve bridges. Prior G-2 information had indicated that the town was held by only one enemy platoon. It soon became apparent, however, that there were enemy forces of some strength at les Droueries between Colonel Ballard and his objective. Orders were consequently issued for the attack on les Droueries. At 0530 two "companies," each with about thirty men, moved out abreast to seize two crossroads on the two trails from Angoville-au-Plain southwest. The third company followed in support. The enemy frustrated the frontal attack with small arms and mortars but a new group of men, mainly from the 506th Parachute Infantry, arrived and succeeded in flanking the enemy on the right. Some progress had been made, although the Germans had not been beaten back, when Colonel Ballard received orders from Colonel Johnson to join him at la Barquette. The battalion, therefore, disengaged as soon as it could and returned to Angoville-au- Plain about noon, planning to move to la Barquette across the swamps south of Angoville-au-Plain. However, the area was covered by enemy fire and was soon found impassable, and the battalion moved instead along the west edge toward Bse. Addeville, which Major Allen had just reported he was about to vacate in order to join Colonel Johnson. The 2d Battalion had moved only about 400 yards when it was stopped by heavy fire from the same enemy force which had contested the morning attack on les Droueries. There the battalion remained for the night, in close contact with the enemy. The 501st Parachute Infantry had secured the lock at la Barquette, but strong enemy resistance had prevented the capture of St. Come-du-Mont as well as the destruction of the railroad and highway bridges north of Carentan.While the battle for the causeways raged, the 327th GIR, reinforced by 1/401 had crossed south of Carentan and secured the eastern exits from the town. That accomplished, the 327th began their assault on Carentan from the east. Carentan was surrounded and being attacked from two sides but the Germans held. The attacking forces were ordered to pull back to allow a massive artillery and naval gunfire bombardment of Carentan to begin. At dawn of June 12, the barrage lifted and the assault began anew. 1/506 and 2/506 attacked from the west and the 501st and 327th attacked from the east and north. Quick advances were made and Carentan was seized. By June 14, UTAH and OMAHA had been completely linked. The Germans had launched several counter-attacks at Carentan but were brutally repulsed. The 101st had linked the forces landing at OMAHA and UTAH. The 502nd PIR had linked up with the 82nd Airborne and the 4th Infantry Divisions while the 327th had linked up with the 29th and 1st Infantry Divisions at OMAHA.
Colonel Robert "Bob"Sink
